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1 Introduction
All literature comparing the Cournot and Bertrand outcomes in private mar-
kets points out the superiority of the Cournot model in terms of higher prof-
its earned by competing firms.1 This result, first established by SINGH AND
VIVES [1984] in a symmetric duopoly with substitute goods, has been extended
by HÄCKNER [2000] to an oligopoly with both horizontal and vertical diﬀer-
entiation where it has been shown to be conditioned on the existence of small
quality diﬀerences. Indeed, that model highlights how, when quality diﬀerences
are large, a profit ranking reversal occurs for high-quality firms which supply
substitutes. Among others, a reversal of the Singh and Vives’s ranking of prof-
its is found in ZANCHETTIN (2006) which allows for a wide range of cost
asymmetry across firms and shows that profits are higher under Bertrand when
cost asymmetry is strong and/or products are weakly diﬀerentiated, in LÓPEZ
AND NAYLOR [2004] in a wage bargaining with upstream and downstream
firms, and in MOTTA [1993] in a vertical diﬀerentiation framework. Most re-
cently, GHOSH AND MITRA [2010] have reconsidered the relative eﬃciency
of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in markets with public and private firms.
In their model (hereafter GM model) they show that, in contrast to the stan-
dard result with private firms, price competition leads to higher profits with
respect to quantity competition. The reversal result can be explained as fol-
lows. Indeed, the higher Cournot profitability in private markets arises as a
consequence of the lower perceived elasticity of demand under Cournot which
positively aﬀects the ability of firms to set higher prices and gain higher profits.
However, this ability is weakened by the presence of a public firm in a market
which tends to reduce its own price and exert a competitive pressure on rivals’
prices. This tendency towards a price reduction by all firms is higher when
firms compete in quantities rather than in prices, due to the higher importance
given in the Cournot setting by a pure-welfare-maximizing firm to consumers’
surplus compared to industry profits, and can cause firms to set lower prices
and gain lower profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand, leading
to the Ghosh and Mitra’s result. This price-reduction eﬀect, which prevails over
the demand elasticity eﬀect under Cournot, also implies that higher consumer
surplus is enjoyed in the Cournot model relative to a Bertrand model.2
By developing a linear oligopoly model with substitute goods, the present
paper challenges the Ghosh and Mitra’s result, demonstrating that it does not
hold in a mixed market when the objective of an ex-ante public firm is manipu-
lated by the government in order to accomplish social welfare goals. Indeed, in
our framework the objective of the state-controlled enterprise (SCE) is assumed
to change according to the weight assigned by the government on a welfare-
1Whether firms earn higher profits competing under Cournot or under Bertrand is a rele-
vant question in oligopoly theory, since it can aﬀect market entry decisions, as well as firms’
investment choices and the optimal policy settled by the government in regulated markets.
2Ghosh and Mitra also prove that the standard ranking implying higher welfare under
Bertrand in a private market continues to hold in a pure mixed market.
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maximizing basis to the diﬀerent components of social welfare.3 By assuming
that this weight is optimally determined at a pre-play stage of both a quantity
and a price game, we demonstrate that in oligopoly higher profitability is asso-
ciated to Cournot relative to Bertrand, thus recovering the result obtained by
Singh and Vives in a private market. This result derives from the endogenous
choice of the government to give, in the balancing between industry profits and
consumers’ surplus, higher and lower weight to the SCE’s profits respectively
under Cournot and under Bertrand as compared to a purely-mixed market. This
amounts to undertaking a partial privatization policy in the Cournot model,4
which lets the diﬀerent types of firms be more aligned with respect to a profit
target, and a pro-consumer policy in the Bertrand model in which firms’ op-
timal behavior allows for the attainment of higher consumers’ surplus. With
respect to a purely-mixed market, the government’s optimal manipulation suc-
ceeds in enhancing social welfare by correcting the distortions that in a Cournot
and a Bertrand purely-mixed market are respectively due to welfare detrimental
quantity diﬀerences or excessive prices. By focusing on the way in which the
presence of a SCE firm with endogenous objectives shrinks the price-reduction
eﬀect relative to the elasticity demand eﬀect as compared to the pure-welfare
maximization case, our model shows that in oligopoly the dominance of the
latter makes Cournot more profitable than Bertrand, while in a duopoly the
two eﬀects are shown to be perfectly balanced. In the latter case, Cournot
competition and Bertrand competition turn out to be equally profitable.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 and Section 3 illustrate re-
spectively the Cournot and the Bertrand model. A comparison across the two
models and the main results are presented in Section 4 which also concludes.
2 The model with quantity competition
In an oligopolist market firm 0 is assumed to be the SCE firm and to compete
against n private firms (i = 1, .., n) with respect to quantities. Firm 0’s ob-
jective is endogenous and is defined by the generalized welfare (GW) function
M0 = αW + (1− α)π0, where W is social welfare (the sum of consumers’ sur-
plus CS and industry profits), π0 the SCE firm’s profits, and α (with α ≥ 0) the
weight attached by the government to social welfare as opposite to the SCE’s
profits. Determining endogenously this weight amounts to choosing the SCE’s
optimal ownership structure or the optimal composition of its governing board.
Indeed, by assuming α ≥ 0, the following cases may emerge at equilibrium: a)
the SCE firm turns out to be partially privatized when 0 < α < 1, due to the
higher concern for its own profits, or rather fully privatized (α = 0) or nation-
3As shown in BENASSI, CHIRCO AND SCRIMITORE [2011], and following WHITE
[2002], the optimal manipulation of the SCE’s objectives enables the government to strategi-
cally alter the mix of components in a generalized welfare function, leaving room for further
welfare improvements with respect to the pure-welfare maximization case.
4MATSUMURA [1998] first addressed partial privatization in a model with quantity com-
petition. His analysis has been extended to a diﬀerentiated Cournot oligopoly by FUJIWARA
[2007] and to price competition by OHNISHI [2010].
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alized (α = 1), b) the government allows for a pro-consumer composition of the
SCE’s governing board when α > 1 as a consequence of the lower interest in the
SCE’s profits relative to the other components of social welfare.5
The linear demand function in each market is ps = 1− qs − γ
P
z 6=s qz, with
s = (0, 1, .., n) and the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) capturing imperfect substitutability
(γ = 0 implying independent goods and γ = 1 perfect substitutes).6 We assume
constant marginal costs c for all firms, which are normalized to zero without
any loss of generality. A two-stage game runs as follows: the government deter-
mines the optimal α at the first stage, while all firms in the last stage compete
simultaneously in quantities.
Starting from the last stage, the SCE firm solves the following optimization
problem:
max
q0
M0 = αW + (1− α)π0 = α
Ã
CS +
nX
i=1
πi
!
+ π0
where the social welfare functionW is defined as the sum of consumer surplus
CS = 1/2
³
(1− γ)
¡
q20 +
Pn
i=1 q2i
¢
+ γ (q0 +
Pn
i=1 qi)
2
´
and aggregate profits
Π = π0 +
Pn
i=1 πi.
The solution of the first order condition gives the following reaction function
for firm 0:
q0 =
1− γ
Pn
i=1 qi
2− α (1)
At the same stage each private firm maximizes its own profits with respect
to qi, producing the output express by the following reaction function:
qi =
1− γq0 − γ
P
j 6=i qj
2
(2)
By aggregating (2) over all the private firms and solving for the aggregate
private output, we obtain:
nX
i=1
qi =
n (1− γq0)
2 + γ (n− 1) (3)
By solving simultaneously the reaction functions in (1) and (3) for q0 andPn
i=1 qi, and then substituting solutions in (2) in order to derive qi, we find
the optimal quantities qC0 and qCi produced respectively by the SCE and each
5 Indeed, by rewriting the GW function as M0 = α
¡
CS +
Pn
i=1 πi
¢
+ π0, the assumption
α > 1 implies that the sum CS +
Pn
i=1 πi is taken into consideration to a larger extent than
π0.
6This demand derives from maximization of a semi-linear utility function of a representa-
tive consumer.
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private firm as functions of α:
qC0 =
2− γ
(2− γ) (2 + γn)− α (2 + γ (n− 1)) (4)
qCi =
2− γ − α
(2− γ) (2 + γn)− α (2 + γ (n− 1)) (5)
At the first stage, the welfare-maximizing government chooses the opti-
mal α, denoted by αC , which satisfies the condition ∂W/∂αC = 0. We find
αC = 4(1−γ)+γ
2
(1−γ)(4+γn)+γ2 .
7 It can be easily checked that 0 < αC < 1 in the interval
γ ∈ (0, 1) and for any n, which reveals that the optimal choice is to partially
privatize the SCE firm.
At the subgame perfect equilibrium the optimal quantities are:
qC0 =
(1− γ) (4 + nγ) + γ2
γn (1− γ) (γ (n− 1) + 4) + (2− γ)2
qCi =
(1− γ) (2 + γ (n− 1))
γn (1− γ) (γ (n− 1) + 4) + (2− γ)2
The prices clearing the market at equilibrium are the following:
pC0 =
nγ(1−γ)
γn(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2
pCi = qCi =
(1−γ)(2+γ(n−1))
γn(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2
Firms’ profits are reported in Appendix 1B. It is worth noting that, by
evaluating quantities in (4) and (5) when α = 1, we obtain the equilibrium
quantities found in a mixed oligopoly with pure-welfare maximization by Ghosh
and Mitra. We also calculate social welfare under partial privatization and
compare it with that at the GM equilibrium. The analysis allows us to introduce
the following remark.
Remark 1 Under endogenous objectives, partial privatization arises at equi-
librium, with the SCE firm producing less and each private firm producing more
than that they would do in the pure-welfare maximization case. With respect to
the latter, we find on the one hand a more equally distributed production between
the two types of firms which causes a positive impact on social welfare, on the
other hand a market quantity reduction which negatively aﬀects social welfare.
The net eﬀect is positive, as a result of the optimal SCE’s objective manipula-
tion, and yields social welfare improvements regardless of the degree of product
diﬀerentiation and the total number of firms.
By weighing to a larger extent its own profits in the GW function, the gov-
ernment lets the SCE firm be partially owned by the private sector and behave
7See Appendix 1A for a proof of the second order conditions of this maximization problem.
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less aggressively. An alignment of objectives towards profits between the SCE
and the private firms is realized due to the government’s optimal manipulation,
which induces a lower production by the SCE firm and a higher production by
the private firms, leading both firms’ profits to increase. While the quantity
diﬀerential between the two types of firms decreases with a positive eﬀect on
welfare via higher profits, the consumers’ surplus decreases as a consequence
of market quantity contraction. The latter, indeed, is caused by an output re-
duction by the SCE firm which is not outweighed by the private firms’ output
expansion. The re-balancing between the diﬀerent welfare components yields
welfare improvements with respect to a purely-mixed market, since it allows
for the positive eﬀect via profits to dominate the negative eﬀect via consumer
surplus.8
3 The model with price competition
In the price competition framework we keep the assumptions of the above model
and solve backwards the two stage game, identifying the optimal prices at the
last stage and the optimal α at the first one. The direct demand function faced
by firm s (with s = (0, 1, .., n)) is:
qs =
1− γ − (1 + γ (n− 1)) ps + γ
P
z 6=s pz
(1− γ) (1 + γn)
As regards the SCE firm, we identify the price which maximizes the function
M0 = αW + (1− α)π0. That price, namely the reaction function of firm 0, is
the following:
p0 =
(1− α) (1− γ) + γ
Pn
i=1 pi
(2− α) (1 + γ (n− 1)) (6)
For each private firm i (i = 1, .., n) we find that the reaction function
pi =
1−γ+γ(p0+
P
j 6=i pj)
2(1+γ(n−1)) maximizes its own profits. By aggregating the first
order conditions over all the private firms and solving for
Pn
i=1 pi we obtain:
nX
i=1
pi =
n (1− γ + γp0)
2 + γ (n− 1) (7)
The solutions to the simultaneous equations in (6) and (7), and their substi-
tution in the private firm’s reaction function, yields the optimal prices pB0 and
8As stated by GHOSH AND MITRA [2010] p.74, social welfare depends positively on the
aggregate quantity and negatively on the quantity diﬀerential between the SCE and each pri-
vate firm. This amounts to saying that any strategy reducing the diﬀerence q0−qi contributes
to enhancing welfare. The objective to reduce q0− qi in the Cournot framework of our model,
however, is realized by contracting market quantity and thus hurting social welfare. The
optimal manipulation of the SCE firm, indeed, solves this trade-oﬀ leading social welfare to
rise.
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pBi set respectively by the SCE and the private firm and expressed as functions
of α:
p0 = (1−γ)(2+γ(2n−1)−α(2+γ(n−1)))(2(1+nγ)−γ)(nγ+2(1−γ))−α(2+γ(n−1))(1+γ(n−1)) (8)
pi = (1−γ)(2+γ(2n−1)−α(1+nγ))(2(1+nγ)−γ)(2(1−γ)+nγ)−α(2+γ(n−1))(1+γ(n−1)) (9)
At the first stage of the game the SCE firm solves the social welfare max-
imization problem by choosing αB = (2+γ(2n−1))
2
3n2γ2+γn(7−4γ)+(2−γ)2 .
9 The latter, in
contrast to the quantity competition case, is higher than 1 for any γ ∈ (0, 1)
and any n. The solution αB > 1 reveals that partial privatization is not optimal
under Bertrand, as also shown in ONHISHI [2010]. In this regard it should be
stressed that this solution is consistent with our assumptions on SCE’s objective
manipulation which allow for α > 1. From this perspectve our analysis extends
that carried out by GHOSH ANDMITRA [2008] under the hypothesis of partial
privatization and, by allowing to take into account the SCE’s optimal behavior
in the comparison between quantity and price competition, puts forward new
insights with respect to it.10
The optimal prices at the subgame perfect equilibrium are:
pB0 =
γn (1− γ) (γ (n− 1) + 1)
γ3n3 + (1− γ)
³
5γ2n2 + (2− γ)2 + γn (8− 5γ)
´
pBi =
(1− γ) (nγ (nγ + 3 (1− γ)) + (1− γ) (2− γ))
γ3n3 + (1− γ)
³
5γ2n2 + (2− γ)2 + γn (8− 5γ)
´
The output produced by firms at equilibrium are:
qB0 =
γ3n3+(1−γ)(6n2γ2+γn(9−5γ)+(2−γ)2)
(1+γn)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
qBi =
(1+γ(n−1))(γ2n2+(1−γ)(γ(3n−1)+2))
(1+γn)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
Firms profits are calculated and reported in Appendix 1B. By calculating
prices in (8) and (9) when α = 1, we obtain the equilibrium prices of the GM
model. We also compare social welfare at the GM equilibrium with social welfare
under endogenous objectives. This analysis allows us to introduce the following
remark.
9The proof of the second order conditions for αB to be a maximum is in Appendix 1A.
10 Indeed, in their paper of 2008 Ghosh and Mitra search for the optimal degree of priva-
tization in the interval (0, 1) and assess the Cournot-Bertrand ordering comparing market
variables at the Cournot optimal interior solution - which entails that the public firm is par-
tially privatized - and at the upper bound solution in Bertrand, which implies that no weight is
given to the SCE profits. However, for a comparison to be meaningful, the optimal incentives
in the two competitive regimes must be taken into account.
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Remark 2 Under endogenous objectives, the government assigns a lower
weight to the SCE’s profits relative to the other components of social welfare,
which causes both the SCE and the private firms to set lower prices than in the
welfare maximization case. With respect to the latter, we find a market quantity
expansion which positively impacts on social welfare via consumers’ surplus, and
an aggregate profit reduction. The former positive eﬀect aﬀects social welfare to
a larger extent than the latter negative eﬀect, regardless of the degree of product
diﬀerentiation and the total number of firms.
Through strategic manipulation, the government chooses to give higher weight
to the outsider components of social welfare, thus pushing the SCE firm towards
a more aggressive behavior than in the welfare maximization case. Due to higher
aggressiveness, the SCE firm sets a lower price which induces a price reduction
by the private firms and favors an aggregate quantity’s expansion. Clearly the
government’s strategic behavior and the optimal firms’ reactions create at equi-
librium a competitive environment which is more favorable to consumers, with
reduced profits for all firms. We finally highlight that the optimal balancing be-
tween consumers’ welfare and profits allows for welfare improvements compared
to the GM case, since the welfare increase via consumer surplus dominates the
welfare reduction due to lower profits.
4 A comparison between Cournot and Bertrand
In this section we compare the market variables derived in the Cournot and
Bertrand models in the previous section. An inspection of the optimal parame-
ter αC (γ, n) and αB (γ, n) respectively under Cournot and Bertrand allows us
to capture the diﬀerent forces at work in the balancing between the diﬀerent
components of social welfare.
Proposition 1 The optimal parameter αi (γ, n) ( i = C,B) decreases in
the number of private firms n in the Cournot model and increases in n in the
Bertrand model. When the private firms’ number tends to infinite, αC (γ, n)
entails full privatization, while αB (γ, n) implies that the lowest weight is at-
tached to SCE’s profits. The pattern of the optimal parameter with respect to
the number of firms in each setting is shown in Figure 1.
Proof:
The monotonic decreasing pattern of αC (γ, n) derives from the negative sign
of its first derivative with respect to n:
∂ (αC (γ, n))
∂n = −
(1−γ)(2−γ)2
((2−γ)2+γn(1−γ))
2 < 0
In contrast, the monotonic increasing pattern of αB (γ, n) derives from the
positive sign of its first derivative with respect to n:
∂ (αB (γ, n))
∂n =
γ(2+γ(2n−1))(2γn(1−γ)+(2−γ))
(γn(γ(3n−4)+7)+(2−γ)2)
2 > 0.
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The following limit results hold: limn→∞ αC (γ, n) = 0; limn→∞ αB (γ, n) =
4/3.
As discussed in the previous section, in the Cournot model the incentives
for partial privatization imply a higher weight assigned by the government to
π0 relative to the outsider components of social welfare CS +
Pn
i=1 πi (firm 0
cares to some extent about π0 besides W ), while in the Bertrand model the
optimal manipulation of the SCE’s objective function leads the government to
assign a lower weight to π0 relative to CS+
Pn
i=1 πi. These diﬀerent incentives
in the two settings explains the decreasing pattern of αC and the increasing
pattern of αB when n increases (see Figure 1). Indeed, in the Cournot setting,
welfare maximization by the government requires that, following an increase
of the number of firms which reduces individual firm’s’ output, the SCE firm
produces decreasing quantities being increasingly privatized, consistently with
the aim of reducing quantity diﬀerentials and aligning firms’ objectives towards
a profit target. This argument implies that full privatization emerges when
n → +∞. By contrast, when the number of firms increases in the Bertrand
setting, welfare maximization by the government requires a progressively lower
price set by the SCE firm as a result of the decreasing weight put on its own
profits. This is in line with the reduction of private firms’ prices caused by
increased competition and the aim of raising market quantity rather than profits
in the optimal welfare balancing. It is worth noting that, in the limit, the
outcomes of the two model coincide, independently of the mode of competition
and the manipulation strategy. Indeed, when the number of firms increases
infinitely, competition among firms guarantees the achievement of the first-best
allocation, with marginal cost pricing by all firms, zero profits and maximum
consumer surplus. In this respect, our analysis highlights the irrelevance of a
strategic manipulation of the SCE’s objectives in competitive markets.
Figure 1. The optimal weights αC and αB as functions of n (γ = 1/2)
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A comparison of equilibrium prices in the two models allows us to introduce
the following proposition.
Proposition 2
- pC0 (γ, 1) = pB0 (γ, 1); pC0 (γ, n) > pB0 (γ, n) for n > 1 (a)
- pCi (γ, n) > pBi (γ, n) for any n (b)
Proof: See Appendix 2A
A comparison with prices in the GM model case explains the above results.
Indeed, as highlighted by Ghosh and Mitra, and in contrast to a private market
in which the Cournot price always dominates the Bertrand price, pure-welfare
maximization by the public firm induces it to set a price under Bertrand that is
always higher than the equilibrium price under Cournot, the latter being equal
to marginal cost. The same price ordering applies to private firms, the prices of
which coincide only under duopoly. Two eﬀects can be distinguished: a ’welfare
maximization eﬀect’ which lowers to a larger extent pC0 relative to pB0 and creates
a downward pressure on the private firm’s price which lowers pCi with respect
to pBi ; a ’perceived-demand-elasticity eﬀect’ which in Cournot keeps up pCi with
respect to pBi . A perfect balancing of the two eﬀects generates the equivalence
pCi = pBi in a duopoly, while in oligopoly competition among private firms leads
the second eﬀect to prevail. In contrast to the pure-welfare maximization case,
the strategic manipulation of the SCE’s objective function, aimed to enhance
welfare by reducing the quantity diﬀerentials under Cournot and by raising
market quantity under Bertrand, shrinks the diﬀerence between pC0 and pB0 and
reduces the extent of the ’welfare maximization eﬀect’ which never dominates
the ’perceived-demand-elasticity eﬀect’ in our framework. The aforementioned
eﬀects exactly compensate in a duopoly, which causes the equivalence pC0 = pB0
whatever the degree of product diﬀerentiation, while in oligopoly the inequality
pC0 > pB0 always holds due to the prevailing second eﬀect, the magnitude of
which crucially depends on the number of competing firms. This second eﬀect
always prevails for the private firms and leads to the ranking pCi > pBi , regardless
of market structure and the degree of product substitutability.
The results of a comparison between the output produced by each firm and
the aggregate output in the Cournot and the Bertrand market are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
- qC0 (γ, n) > qB0 (γ, n) (a)
- qCi (γ, n) < qBi (γ, n) (b)
- qC0 + nqCi < qB0 + nqBi (c)
- qB0 − qBi < qC0 − qCi (d)
Proof: See Appendix 2B
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In line with Ghosh and Mitra, we show that quantity competition induces
the SCE firm to produce more and each private firm to produce less than price
competition, irrespective of number of firms and the degree of product sub-
stitutability. Indeed, notwithstanding in the Cournot market the SCE firm is
induced to produce less than in the GM case, it keeps on producing relatively
more than in the Bertrand market, due also to the positive eﬀect of higher prices
set by the private firms under Cournot relative to Bertrand, and despite a lower
perceived elasticity of demand. This causes the diﬀerence qC0 −qB0 to shrink, but
its ordering is never reverted. The combined eﬀect of a higher SCE’s produc-
tion in a Cournot market and the lower perceived elasticity of demand induces
a lower production by the private firms. In contrast to the GM case, the SCE’s
output dominance under Cournot turns out not to be large enough to outweigh
the output contraction of private firms under this regime, so that the market
output is lower in Cournot compared to Bertrand. As a consequence of the
higher market quantity, consumers’ surplus under Bertrand always dominates
consumers’ surplus under Cournot: - SC (γ, n) < SB (γ, n). Moreover, despite
the welfare-enhancing reduction of the quantity diﬀerential between the SCE’s
and the private firms under Cournot, it turns out to be higher under Cournot
than under Bertrand. Both the inequalities (c) and (d) ensure that the standard
welfare ranking WC (γ, n) < WB (γ, n) always holds in our setting.
The inspection of prices and quantities allows us to interpret the results
concerning the profits’ ranking which are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 4
- πC0 (γ, n) > πB0 (γ, n) for any n
- πCi (γ, 1) < πBi (γ, 1); πCi (γ, n) > πBi (γ, n) for n > 1
Proof: See Appendix 2C
In oligopoly, higher Cournot profitability applies to both the SCE firm and
the private firms, as standard in a private market. While the result for private
firms derives from a positive eﬀect of higher prices under Cournot which always
dominates the negative eﬀect of lower quantities compared to Bertrand, for
the SCE firm it emerges as a consequence of its attitude to produce more in a
Cournot market than in a Bertrand market and is sustained by equivalent prices
in the two settings under duopoly and higher Cournot prices under oligopoly. In
a duopoly, however, a reversal of the profits’ order with respect to the oligopoly
case occurs for the private firm which gains higher profits under Bertrand. The
role of market structure on equilibrium profits is highlighted in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Aggregate profits in Cournot and Bertrand markets are respec-
tively ΠC =
pC0
γ and Π
B =
pB0
γ . For any degree of product substitutability,
Bertrand and that Cournot aggregate profits are never lower than Bertrand prof-
its: indeed, ΠC ≥ ΠB for n ≥ 1, with the equality holding for n = 1.
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The above corollary clearly shows that firm 0’s equilibrium prices defines
the extent of aggregate profits under Cournot and Bertrand. The latter are
shown to be equivalent in a duopoly, due to the equivalence of the SCE’s prices
in the two competition regimes under duopoly that follows from Proposition
2a, which amounts to proving that at equilibrium the contribution of aggregate
profits to social welfare is independent of the mode of competition. The mode
of competition matters in defining a diﬀerent profits’ contribution to welfare
when the market is populated by a higher number of private firms, competition
among which lowers the equilibrium prices in Bertrand to a larger extent than
in Cournot, and consequently lowers pB0 more than pC0 . In oligopoly, indeed,
aggregate profits are higher under Cournot since the inequality pC0 > pB0 holds
in this case, as stated in Proposition 2b.
4.1 Concluding remarks
This paper revisits the standard comparison between Cournot and Bertrand
focusing on firms’ profitability in mixed markets when the objective function of
a state-controlled firm is optimally defined by a welfare-interested government.
This manipulation strategy is shown to enhance social welfare with respect to
the pure-welfare maximization case, being consistent with a privatization policy
under Cournot and a pro-consumer policy under Bertrand. Our work basically
highlights how the presence of firms with heterogeneous objectives on a market
aﬀects the conditions for firms’ profitability in the two settings of Cournot and
Bertrand competition. While Ghosh and Mitra have proved that the presence of
a welfare-maximizing firm on the market leads quantity competition to be more
beneficial than price competition for consumers and less beneficial for firms, we
have shown how a behavioral alignment between the public and the private firms,
realized through a SCE objective’s manipulation by the government, restores
in oligopoly the conditions for higher Cournot profitability that is typical of
private markets. Larger aggregate output in Bertrand markets is also shown
to translate into higher consumers’ surplus. By underlining the impact of the
government’s strategic choices on the optimal behavior of private firms in the
two settings, and moreover the role of competition among private firms on the
market outcomes, the paper identifies the market forces moving towards higher
Bertrand or higher Cournot profitability, showing how in a duopoly these forces
are perfectly balanced. In this regard, our study oﬀers an interesting example of
market in which firms share the same amount of profits, regardless of whether
they compete in quantities or prices.
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APPENDIX 1
Appendix 1a
The second order conditions for welfare maximization with respect to αC
and αB are satisfied:
∂2W
∂2αC = −
(γ2+(1−γ)(nγ+4))
4
(γ2+(1−γ)(nγ2(n−1)+4(1+γn)))((2−γ)(γn(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2))2
< 0
∂2W
∂2αB = −
(1−γ)3(γ2(3n2+1)+γn(7−4γ)+4(1−γ))4
(1+nγ)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
3
(2(1+nγ)−γ)2
< 0
Appendix 1b
SCE’s profits and private firm’s profits under Cournot:
πC0 =
nγ(1−γ)((1−γ)(4+nγ)+γ2)
(γn(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)
2
πCi =
(1−γ)2(2+γ(n−1))2
(γn(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)2
SCE’s profits and private firm’s profits under Bertrand:
πB0 =
nγ(1−γ)(1+γ(n−1))(γ3n3+(1−γ)(6γ2n2+γn(9−5γ)+(2−γ)2))
(1+γn)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
2
πBi =
(1−γ)(1+γ(n−1))(γ2n2+(1−γ)(2+γ(3n−1)))
2
(1+γn)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))2
APPENDIX 2
Appendix 2a
(a) The price set by the SCE firm under Cournot is never lower than the
same price under Bertrand:
pC0 − pB0 =
= n
2γ4(1−γ)(n−1)(2+γ(n−1))
(nγ(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
≥ 0
with the equality holding when n = 1.
(b) The price set by a private firm under Cournot is always higher than the
same price under Bertrand:
pCi − pBi =
=
nγ2(1−γ)(γn(5nγ−13γ+8)+γ3n(n−2)2+(1−γ)(2−γ)2)
(nγ(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
> 0
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Appendix 2b
(a) The SCE’s output under Cournot is always higher that the same output
under Bertrand:
qC0 − qB0 =
=
n2γ3((1−γ)(2(2−γ)+nγ(6−γ))+γ2n2(2−γ))
(1+nγ)(nγ(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
> 0
(b) As regards each private firm, the output under Cournot is always lower
that the same output under Bertrand:
qCi − qBi =
= − nγ
2(nγ(1−γ)(γ2(1+n2)+8−5γ)+n2γ2(5+2γ2−6γ)+(1−γ)(2−γ)2)
(1+nγ)(nγ(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
< 0
(c) Market quantity is always higher in a Bertrand market:¡
qB0 + nqBi
¢
−
¡
qC0 + nqCi
¢
=
= (1−γ)(2−γ)
4+2γ5n5(1−γ)+n2γ2A(1−γ)+nγB(1−γ)(2−γ)2+γ3n3C+n4γ4D
(1+nγ)(nγ(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))
> 0
where:
A = 68− 6γ3 + 46γ2 − 101γ
B = 13 + γ2 − 10γ
C = 45− 12γ3 + 62γ2 − 94γ
D = 15 + 9γ2 − 23γ
with A,B,C,D > 0
(d) The quantity diﬀerential between the SCE and a private firm is always
higher under Cournot than under Bertrand:
Let us pose ΨC = qC0 −qCi and ΨB = qB0 −qBi . We find the following quantity
diﬀerentials in the two regimes:
ΨC = 2−γγn(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2
ΨB = 2−γ(3−γ−2n(1−γ))γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ))
with the diﬀerence Φ = ΨC −ΨB always positive:
Φ =
nγ2((1−γ)(2−γ)2+γn((1−γ)(8−3γ)+γn(3−2γ)))
(γ3n3+(1−γ)(5γ2n2+(2−γ)2+γn(8−5γ)))(γn(1−γ)(γ(n−1)+4)+(2−γ)2)
> 0
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Appendix 2c
In a duopoly, the SCE firm always gets higher profits under Cournot. Indeed,
calling f (n, γ) the diﬀerence πC0 (n, γ)−πB0 (n, γ), it is easy to verify that when
n = 1 that diﬀerence is strictly positive:
f (1, γ) =
¡
γ4 (1− γ)
¢
/ (γ + 1)
¡
4− 3γ2
¢2 > 0. In contrast, the private
firms earn higher profits under Bertrand, as shown by the negative sign of the
function g (n, γ) = πCi (n, γ) − πBi (n, γ) when n = 1. Indeed
g (1, γ) = −
¡
γ4 (1− γ)
¢
/ (γ + 1)
¡
4− 3γ2
¢2 < 0.
Since f (1, γ) = − g (1, γ), the two diﬀerences perfectly compensate. Under
oligopoly the higher Cournot profitability for the SCE firm continues to hold
and also applies to private firms. The ranking πC0 (γ, n) > πB0 (γ, n), namely the
inequality f (n, γ) > 0, is shown to hold by numerical simulation (see Figure
A1).
Figure A1
In contrast, for a private firm the oligopolist market structure matters in
reverting the order of profits with respect to the duopoly case. Numerical
simulations indicate that the inequality πCi (γ, n) > πBi (γ, n) - equivalent to
g (n, γ) > 0 - holds for any n > 1 and any γ, as shown in Figure A2.
Figure A2
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